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Smaller Exchanges, Larger Regimes: How Trading in
Small, Interdependent Units Affects Treaty Stability
Hanna Chung*
Suppose two parties desire to divide a $300 prize equally, but only have
$100 bills at their disposal. As long as the unit of exchange remains too large for
equal division, the two parties seem destined for an uneven and uneasy
agreement. The solution seems simple: exchange the $100 bills for $50 bills, so
that the unit of exchange is small enough to support an equal division.
Theories in effective policymaking and diplomacy readily acknowledge this
concept.' Treaties that take an all-or-nothing approach 2 are out of style.
Breaking up a large issue into smaller entitlements would allow for more
proportionate divisions that correspond to proportions the parties feel they
deserve.' Countries could benefit from agreeing to have joint jurisdiction over
BA 2005, Yale College; MEd 2007, University of Nevada, Las Vegas; JD Candidate 2010, The
University of Chicago Law School.
See, for example, Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour, and M. Remzi Sanver, A Minimax Procedure for
Negotiating Multilateral Treaties, in Rudolf Avenhaus and I. William Zartrman, eds, Diplomagy Games:
Formal Models and International Negotiations 280-81 (Springer 2007) (demonstrating that negotiators
can promote consensus by separating negotiations into several issues and prioritizing fall-back
positions where parties do not prevail on all issues); see also Stanislaw Wellisz, On External
Diseconomies and the Government-Assisted Invisible Hand, in Bruce M. Russett, ed, Economic Theories of
International Politics 64-65 (Markham 1968) (identifying the indivisibility problem inherent in
nuisance laws that either permit a polluter to exist or bans it and suggesting that Pigovian taxes
are a way to make the solution seem more divisible).
2 For an infamous example, see The Treaty of Versailles (June 28, 1919), online at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subjectmenus/versaillesmenu.asp (visited Nov 21, 2009). Perhaps
one could argue that these lopsided agreements reflect the lopsided powers behind the
agreements, as when the victors of a war force undesirable terms on the conquered, but surely
even in such cases the monolithic unit of "give me everything you have" in exchange for the
equally monolithic unit of "I will not utterly destroy you" deals with units of exchange far too
large for the finer gradations of balance that might be conducive to a well-written treaty.
3 Consider H. Peyton Young, Equiy 16-17 (Princeton 1994) (agreeing generally that divisibility of
the contested good may help parties settle on a division that corresponds to parties' sense of
proportionate entitlement, but contesting that proportionality is enough to satisfy human
intuitions about equity).
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disputed areas, rather than engaging in a costly fight for complete control.4
Countries that disagree on the appropriate scope of international criminal law or
the jurisdictional limits of the International Criminal Court may still agree that
piracy should be treated as an international crime.' Rather than arguing for
complete freedom of the seas or absolute jurisdiction over territorial waters,
countries may negotiate intermediary zones with shared rights.6 Perceptions of
fairness are important to gaining credibility for one's position and building
international consensus, and a state that cannot justify its position with
principles of equity must dip into its limited supply of political capital to pay for
its choice. Thus, theories of diplomacy and equitable division might lead one to
predict that nations prefer to negotiate in smaller units, insofar as they facilitate
perceptions of fair, proportionate division.
Counterintuitively, however, the current trend in treaty negotiation is not
toward working with ever-smaller units of exchange. If smaller units were all that
were necessary to facilitate exchange, then a state could always create the proper
balance of benefits through side payments. Any divisibility problem could be
solved with the introduction of money. However, in practice, states often
See, for example, Tuomas Kuokkanen, International Law and the Environment 110-11 nn 28-30
(Kluwer 2002) (listing several treaties involving joint jurisdiction, or "condominiums," over
waterways and frontier lands); Exclusive Economic Zone Co-Operation Treaty between the
Republic of Guyana and the State of Barbados (Dec 2, 2003), 2277 UN Treaty Set 202 (2003)
(agreeing on joint jurisdiction, control, management, development, exploration, and exploitation
rights over the area where the exclusive economic zones of the two countries overlap, as
determined by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea). See also George G. Wilson, Handbook
of International Law 93-97 (West 1910) (describing several early twentieth century examples of joint
jurisdictions and leases involving other countries' territories); Feroz Ahmad, Ottoman Perceptions of
the Capitulations 1800-1814, 11 J Islamic Stud 1, 1-2 (2000) (suggesting that the Ottoman sultans
granted capitulations to foreign nations, giving the European powers jurisdiction over their
expatriates in the Ottoman Empire, as a matter of privilege and convenience and not as a matter
of rights and obligations).
Compare Is A UN International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?, Hearing before the
Subcommittee on International Operations of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 105th
Cong, 2d Sess, 10, 13-14 (1998) (statement of David J. Scheffer, US Ambassador-at-Large for
War Crimes Issues) (expressing the US' willingness to submit to the International Criminal
Court's automatic jurisdiction over crimes of genocide and unwillingness to commit to "war
crimes" jurisdiction), with United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS") (Dec
10, 1982), 1833 UN Treaty Ser 3, Art 101(1982) (agreeing on a formal definition for the
international crime of piracy), and US Const Art I, § 8, cl 10 ("The Congress shall have
Power... To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and offenses
against the Law of Nations ... .
See UNCLOS, 1833 UN Treaty Ser 3, Arts 2, 3-15, 55-59 (cited in note 5) (defining the
boundaries of territorial waters and "exclusive economic zones," as well as the overlapping rights
afforded to each).
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disfavor side payment schemes as overly "redistributive. ' '7 To the extent that
states have formally implemented such payment schemes into agreements, they
have often given a conceptual justification for why these payments are directly
linked to the goals of the project at hand, rather than admitting that they are
simply payments to compensate for uneven exchanges. 8 On the contrary, some
of the most successful modern treaties appear to be of a scope that would have
been unimaginable a century ago, ranging across multiple regulatory regimes and
binding multiple countries.9 On the one hand, countries are "unbundling" what
were traditionally larger "packages" of sovereign rights and trading in exchanges
of smaller commitments, but on the other hand, they are making many of these
"small-unit" exchanges to build linkages that make larger regimes possible.'0
The conclusion: merely exchanging in smaller units is not enough; there
must be some value added in carefully selecting those small pieces of exchange
that promote interdependence. To illustrate, consider the earlier problem
involving the $300 prize. If exchanging in smaller units was all that mattered, the
parties could simply convert the $100 bills into $50 bills and make an even split.
Instead, many of these large-scale treaties function as though the parties agreed
to split the $200 evenly, then agreed to put the remaining $100 into a joint
savings account in order to share the interest. Notice in this example that, strictly
from a monetary perspective, the parties do not gain any advantage by choosing
this second approach, given the opportunity cost. The parties could have
probably earned the same amount of interest investing $50 on their own.
However, there is some value added from being able to secure the stability of an
interdependent relationship for the future. In the example, the added value of
See David W. Leebron, The Boundaries of the WTO: Linkages, 96 Am J Intl L 5, 14 (noting that
countries often frame linkages as conceptually linked, because parties tend to be resistant to
"purely redistributional payments"). See also Robert 0. Keohane, The Demand for International
Regimes, in Beth A. Simmons and Richard H. Steinberg, eds, International Law and International
Relations 33-34 (Cambridge 2006) (observing that locally entrenched bureaucracies can prevent
side payments from being a possible compromise solution).
See, for example, Leebron, 96 Am J Intl L at 14 (cited in note 7) (observing that, in negotiations
over the environment, the developed countries established a fund for developing countries in
order to "pay for certain measures of environmental protection," rather than agreeing to
unrestricted side payments). For an example of an actual redistributive effort via side payments,
see Eiko R. Thielemann, Symbolic Politics or Effective Burden-Sharing? Redistribution, Side-Payments, and
the European Refugee Fund, 43(4) J Comm Mkt Stud 807, 822 (2005) (noting that the European
Refugee Fund's allocation rules favor countries who pose the "greatest credible threat to cause
difficulties in related areas of EU policy-making').
9 See, for example, Treaty Establishing the European Community (1997) 37 ILM 56 (1998);
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization ("Marrakesh Agreement")
(Apr 15, 1994), 1867 UN Treaty Ser 154, Art 2, 4 (1994).
10 See Leebron, 96 Am J Intl L at 12-13 (cited in note 7) (describing how strategic linkages "increase
the means and variability of exchange").
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pooling resources might not be enough for the prizewinners to justify entering
into a long-term relationship with each other. However, in the international
context, countries may benefit greatly from binding each other to agreements
with many interdependent clauses, simply because this makes breaches costly
and builds incentives for countries to maintain cooperative relationships with
one another.
This Comment explores how exchanging in smaller, interdependent units
of entitlement during treaty negotiation helps build consensus for large treaty
regimes and creates incentives for maintaining stable, cooperative relationships
in the long run. The existing literature related to this topic takes three
approaches. Prior literature on the concept of equity has focused mostly on the
division problem: how to allocate indivisible goods and how to create a
proportionality or prioritization system that appeals to parties' intuitive
understandings of fairness." Prior economics and game theory literature has
largely focused on explaining how cooperation and coalitions affect the
feasibility of discrete transactions, such as spot contracts. 12 Prior literature on
international law tends to limit itself to political analysis on how issue linkages
have facilitated consensus during treaty negotiations. 3 This Comment tries to
link these three approaches together to explain the economic incentives behind a
general international phenomenon: the tendency to negotiate in more narrowly
defined entitlements (smaller units) to build consensus for ambitious,
comprehensive treaties that stretch over several regulatory regimes (greater
interdependence). This approach differs from earlier approaches in equity
literature because it proposes that parties want more than fair division from a
discrete transaction. It differs from previous approaches in contract theory
because the parties in focus here are states,' 4 who all have incentives to create
See, for example, Young, Equiy at 13-14 (cited in note 3) (suggesting that all-encompassing
theories based on the difference principle, greatest good principle (or proportionality principle),
or simplistic solutions based on simply converting an indivisible good into a divisible one, cannot
account for all intuitions of fairness).
12 See, for example, Larry A. DiMatteo, et al, Visions of Contract Theory: Raionalioy, Baqgaining, and
Inteipretalion 13-18 (Carolina 2007) (summarizing the foundational works in law-and-economics-
based contract theory, which tend to focus on spot contracts and efficient breach principles);
consider Lester G. Telser, The Usefulness of Core Theory in Economics, 8 J Econ Perspectives 151
(1994) (explaining under what conditions rational actors will choose to act in a coalition, and
under what conditions they will choose to go-it-alone).
13 See, for example, Leebron, 96 Am J Intl L at 17-19 (cited in note 7) (cataloguing the linkage types
and their political usefulness).
14 Standard contract theory might not apply well when the parties to a contract are states rather than
individuals, since states are considered sophisticated parties who do not need paternalistic
doctrines, since there is no court to punish breaches, and since states must anticipate long-term
relationships with one another, regardless of the temporary nature of their contracts/treaties. I
later make the argument that the principle of efficient breach does not translate well to contracts
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agreements for the long-term 5 and institutionalize norms that incentivize
cooperation. It differs in focus from prior literature in international law in that it
tries to generalize a larger economic principle behind why linkages help treaties
succeed.
Section I explains the concept of a smaller, interdependent unit of
exchange and contrasts this to the more general concept of divisibility. It then
identifies some of the benefits of working with smaller, interdependent units of
exchange. Section II explores how the concept of the smaller, interdependent
unit of exchange has facilitated the negotiation of two successful treaties: the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
Section III uses a failed attempt at international negotiation, Mexico's push for
tradable remedies, to illustrate why merely working with smaller, more divisible
units (such as side payments) is not enough to forge an agreement. It makes the
argument that a treaty needs to employ both smaller units of exchange and
cross-linkages that build interdependence in order to incentivize parties to stick
to their commitments. Section IV concludes with the suggestion that countries
may have overestimated the costs of interdependence and overly discounted the
institutional benefits that arise from creating treaties that increase
interdependence.
I. THE BENEFITS OF EXCHANGING IN SMALLER,
INTERDEPENDENT UNITS
First, a definition is in order: What is a smaller, interdependent unit of
exchange? By "smaller," I mean to contrast the current scope of the legal
entitlement being exchanged to how countries have traditionally conceptualized
the entitlement. The idea of a smaller unit of exchange is easiest to understand in
terms of tangible, divisible goods. Suppose two siblings are quarreling over who
gets the whole cake, and a mediator persuades the siblings to divide the cake into
two pieces. The parties are now dealing with a smaller unit of division:
previously they could only think of their entitlements in terms of the whole cake;
now they understand that there can be piecemeal entitlement to the cake.
between states, because there are such high costs to destabilizing agreements when 1) there is no
authoritative adjudicator to determine liability and damages and 2) states can expect to live with
the consequences of their previous interactions with each other for as long as they exist.
15 Consider The Tinoco Claims Arbiralion (Great Britain v Costa Rica), 1 UN Rep Intl Arbitral Awards
369, 375-99 (1923) (holding that a country's commitments are still binding, even if there has been
a regime change). This case generally affirms the principle that the identity of a country can
survive a radical change in government. As such, when countries negotiate treaties, they must
contemplate that the treaty could survive a regime change or revolution.
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Some goods, unlike cakes, lose all their value when divided. Baby-splitting
is good for neither mother.16 Even with these indivisible goods, however, parties
can think of their legal entitlements in narrower terms. For example, parents
fighting over child custody can think of entitlements, not in terms of "pieces of
children," but in terms of "pieces of time." Here, too, the parties are now
dealing in smaller units. Previously they thought of their entitlements to their
children as an indivisible whole; now they think of their entitlements in terms of
time units. 7 Pushing this concept further, there is no limit to how far parties
could conceptually divide a legal entitlement. The law is recognizing ever-smaller
sticks in the bundle of rights that constitute personal property; 8 more traditional
rights such as the right to exclude have been divided into smaller entitlements
such as the exclusive right to make derivative works or make public
performances. 9  Similarly, states are willing to conceptualize their legal
entitlements in more focused, narrow terms: instead of asserting general
sovereignty rights over the sea, for example, they might negotiate in terms of
fishing rights, tight of transit, or rights to minerals on the seabed."i Thus, by
"smaller units," I mean to express the parties' general willingness to think of
their legal entitlements as an aggregate of many narrow rights, rather than as one
indivisible whole.
By "interdependent," I mean that the system of consequences attached to
the treaty terms helps ensure that it is in each party's self-interest not to cross
the other party's interest. In private contract law, this interdependence is
artificially created through the use of expectation damages, including reasonable
16 1 Kings 3:16-28 (relating the story of Solomon's uniquely "equitable" baby-sharing judgment).
17 See Young, Equiy at 20-23 (cited in note 3) (suggesting forced equality (giving the good to no
one), lotteries, rotation, compensation, queuing, and priorities as ways of distributing indivisible
goods).
18 See, for example, Lior Zemer, The Idea of Authorship in Copyrifght 43-45 (Ashgate 2007) (discussing
some ways in which the traditional "bundle of rights" associated with owning real property must
be revised to account for the unusual balance of rights involved in intellectual property).
19 Other examples of dividing legal entitlements into smaller units include the division of property
rights to separate underground easements or credits for tall buildings. See, for example, NYC
Zoning-Glossay (2009), online at http://www.nyc.gov/htrnl/dcp/html/zone/glossary.shtml
(visited Nov 21, 2009) (defining the concept of "development rights," which gives the owner the
right to construct buildings up to a given height and the concept of "TDRs," which allows
owners of development rights to sell its height rights to other developers). This is in sharp
contrast to the traditional view of real property ownership, which held that ownership extended
from the core of the earth to the skies. See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England,
vol 2, ch 2, 18 ("Cuius est solum, eius est usque ad caelum. [For whoever owns the soil it is theirs up to
Heaven and down to Hell.]").
20 Compare UNCLOS, Arts 55-58 (cited in note 5) (defining economic rights to the sea) with
UNCLOS, Arts 37-39 (defining rights of navigation).
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reliance damages. 2' A party cannot breach without internalizing the cost of the
breach, because the courts will force breaching parties to disgorge unjust
enrichment and restore the breached party. 22 However, states parties to treaties
must build this interdependence into the structure of the treaty, since liability
and damages for treaty breaches are far short of guaranteed.23 For example, the
World Trade Organization (WTO) gives each party the right to be treated
equally under the "most-favoured nation" principle. 24 Each state party, when
relinquishing its right to discriminate against foreign trade, depends on other
states parties to similarly refrain from exercising their sovereign power to
discriminate. The WTO Dispute Settlement Body makes this interdependency of
legal entitlements clear in the way that it punishes breaches: if a breaching state
engages in anti-competitive practices in one area of trade, it permits the injured
state to engage in proportionate anti-competitive practices in another area of
trade.2" Under my definition, countries deal with interdependent units of
exchange when they consciously attach systems of benefits and consequences to
the terms of the treaty to make breaches more costly.
A. Advantages of Working with Smaller, Interdependent Units
Parties can gain two types of advantages by working in smaller,
interdependent units. The first type comes from properties of divisibility
inherent to working with smaller units. The second type comes from the
increased cooperation and stability that comes with greater interdependence.
1. Advantages in divisibility.
Thinking in conceptually smaller units of entitlement allows parties to
overcome indivisibility problems. If there are two heirs competing for one
21 See Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 201, 206, 239-43 (Addison-Wesley 4th
ed 2004) (explaining the economic rationales justifying the award of expectation damages and
consider ways of calculating optimal reliance).
22 Id at 202--04 (calculating optimal levels of performance and illustrating the concept of the
efficient breach).
23 See Harold H. Koh, Why Do Nalions Obey International Law?, 106 Yale L J 2599, 2603 (1997) ("Like
most laws, international rules are rarely enforced, but usually obeyed.").
24 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT 1947") (1947), 55 UN Treaty Ser 194, 61 Stat
pt 1, TIAS 1700, Art 1 (requiring all member countries to confer to one another "most favoured
nation" status). Note that GATT 1947 has been adopted in its entirety into the modern GAT
that governs the WTO. See Marrakesh Agreement, 1867 UN Treaty Set 154 at Art 2, 4 (cited in
note 9) (incorporating GATT 1947 into the modern GATT for the formation of the WTO).
25 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU"),
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 UN Treaty Ser
401, 33 ILM 1226, Art 22, 3-4 (1994) (establishing the procedures for determining liabilities
for breach and appropriate retaliatory measures).
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family heirloom, both parties cannot be satisfied as long as the entitlement is
conceptualized in terms of the one item. Even if the entitlement is
conceptualized in terms of days of the week, all parties cannot be satisfied if
there are eight heirs. Imagining smaller units of entitlement allows for more
equal divisions between multiple parties.26
However, equity scholars are quick to point out that human intuitions
regarding fairness are not always linked to proportionality.2 7 Participants may
come to negotiate with a different set of priority rules in mind.2' An organ
donor program, for example, may prioritize giving the organ to a hard-to-match
patient over a patient who has been waiting longer in line. 29 Nor would using
smaller units of entitlement solve the problem of resentment from disappointed
expectations 30 or envy from others' windfalls.3 1 While these critics raise genuine
obstacles to reaching a fair result, they discount the fact that divisibility plays
other roles than merely facilitating proportionality.
26 At some point, however, further division of the entitlement may make it worthless (for example,
if there are ninety heirs to the heirloom, it may not be worth everyone's time to share the good
with so many people), and the parties may have to rethink how they divide the entitlement to
preserve its worth (for example, the ninety heirs could settle for an equal chance to win complete
ownership over the heirloom in a lottery). This subsection's discussion on equitable process, rather
than equitable division, can be seen as another way of conceptually dividing legal entitlements,
where parties no longer think of dividing the prize equally, but rather dividing the opportunii to
obtain the whole prize equally.
27 See, for example, Young, Equity at 40-41 (cited in note 3) (explaining that participants may often
agree on an order of priority that gives extra weight to certain parties' entitlements).
28 Developing countries, for example, may feel that they should be given an opportunity to share in
future seabed profits, even if they do not have the capital or the resources to pursue seabed
mining. Consider Declaration of the Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and Subsoil
Thereof, Beyond the Limits ofNationalJurisdicion, UN Doc A/Res/2749 (XXV) (1970) (declaring that
the seabed and ocean floor are the "common heritage of mankind"); Declaration on the Establishment
of a New International Economic Order, UN Doc A/Res/3201 (S-Vi) (1974) (expressing the general
sentiment among developing nations that they had been exploited and the developed nations had
an obligation to assist in their current economic struggles). Minor NATO countries during the
Cold War felt that the superpowers should shoulder the greater part of the cost. See Mancur
Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, An Economic Theory ofAlliances, in Russett, ed, Economic Theories
of International Poliics 43-44 (cited in note 1) (explaining that non-superpower nations have less of
an incentive to bear the costs of a military alliance because they gain very little utility from further
militarization after a certain point, while superpowers continue to reap benefits).
29 See Young, Equiy at 28-29 (cited in note 3) (describing the US kidney donation system, which
takes match and likelihood of a successful transplant into consideration).
30 Consider Oliver Hart and J. Moore, Contracts as Reference Points, 123 Q J Econ 1, 2-3 (2008)
(suggesting that parties will perform future obligations poorly if the payoff from the agreement
turns out to be less than expected).
31 See Steven J. Brams and Alan D. Taylor, Fair Division 66-67, 234 (Cambridge 1996) (critiquing
negotiation analysis for not considering problems of envy, which may cause parties to be
discontent, even in win-win situations, if they believe that other parties won a greater share).
Vol 10 No. 2
Smaller Exchanges, Lager Regimes
First, dividing the prize into smaller conceptual units may allow for more
win-win transactions to arise, because parties can take advantage of the
subjective differences in valuation. If one party prefers to visit Las Vegas during
winter holidays and the other party prefers to vacation there in the summer, a
time-share arrangement that respects these preferences will seem like a win-win
deal to both sides. Similarly, if fishing rights are important to a coastal country's
industry and if rights of transit are important to a superpower with a large naval
force, a territorial agreement that gives exclusive economic zones to the fishing-
dependent country and rights of transit to the naval superpower will also seem
like a win-win deal. Although these arrangements will not necessarily solve the
problems of envy and resentment,32 they can certainly facilitate agreements in
the right direction by allocating particular resources to the parties that will value
them more.
Second, dividing a larger commitment into smaller steps may allow parties
to form "incompletely theorized agreements, ' 33 where parties can find common
ground on a larger ideal or principle while disagreeing on the particulars of how
that principle should be applied. For example, states that cannot currently
commit to a single definition for "aggression"" may simply agree to agree at
some future date and agree to create a committee to propose an appropriate
definition.35 These early commitments may serve as reference points for
establishing customary norms of international law and rallying consensus for
future treaties that pin down particulars.36
32 For example, a party who feels he has won 51 percent of the prize may still envy an opponent
who subjectively values her share at 75 percent, because he may feel that he could have extracted
more concessions from the opposing party.
33 See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 35 (Oxford 1996) (proposing the theory
that large groups of people may form a consensus on a general principle without being able to
agree on all of the details).
34 See, for example, Lori F. Damrosch, et al, International Law: Cases and Materials 1370 (West 4th ed
2001) (reporting that the International Criminal Court's Preparatory Commission has be unable to
finalize a proposed definition of "aggression").
35 See Formulation of the Principles RecogniZed in the London Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the
Judgment of the Tribunal, UN Doc A/Res/177 (1I) (1947) (authorizing the International Law
Commission to establish principles for judging future acts of aggression). This gradual process of
coming to an agreement also happens in contract law, where parties may gradually settle on
particular terms of agreement and gradually bind themselves to increasing levels of obligation,
through a series of "letters of intent" or preliminary contracts that come with "cuoa in contrahendo"
liability. See Soili Nysten-Haarala, The Long-Term Contract: Contract Law and Contracting 92-98
(Kauppakaari Oyj 1998) (showing that private contract law recognizes intermediary steps to
liability and contractual agreement, using the German legal system as an example).
36 See, for example, The Justice Case (Case 3), Opinion and Judgment, in Trials of Individuals
before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No 10, 1946-1949, vol III,
954, 983-84 (1951) (addressing the argument raised by German judges facing prosecution for
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2. Advantages in interdependence.
If divisibility advantages were all that mattered, then parties would have no
reason to build grandiose treaty regimes that regulate large areas of law.
Countries, like firms engaging in spot contracts, would tailor individualized
treaties for separate transactions. Territorial disputes could be solved by simply
measuring out the exact proportions of land reflecting the strength of the
countries' respective claims. When the legal entitlement is indivisible (that is,
where the contested good loses value if the countries attempt to split it or own it
jointly), one party could compensate the other through side payments.
However, that is not the way that international law seems to work.
Although there are some inherent benefits to working with smaller units of
transaction, as discussed in the previous section, careful selection of the type of
smaller unit used can help promote interdependence. For example, suppose a
state simply chooses to remove opposition to a proposed treaty issue through
one-time side payments. Here, the state uses the advantage of divisibility
inherent in money in order to build consensus for the treaty. It involves using a
unit of exchange that is "smaller" (in contrast to the larger units of "treaty
concessions"), but not more interdependent. Once the state makes the one-time
side payment, it has no further obligations to the other state. It could even
rescind the treaty concession at a later time through reservations or amended
treaties,37 making the one-time side payment only worth the amount of time that
the treaty concession lasted. By contrast, suppose that the same state, rather than
giving a one-time side payment, makes a credible structural investment in the
crimes of genocide that there was no previous international law outlawing genocide). In this case,
the Tribunal determined that, regardless of the fact that there was no explicit international norm
against genocide before the Second World War, it was permissible for the defendants to be tried
under the new international standard, rather than under Nazi German law. Although this ex post
facto lawmaking was controversial at the time, the success of the Nuremberg trials helped forge
general acceptance of the norm that international courts could try defendants for international
crimes and helped pave the way for the International Criminal Tribunals of Yugoslavia and
Rwanda.
3 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("Vienna Convention") (May 23, 1969), 1155 UN
Treaty Set 331, Arts 2(1)(d), 19 (1969) (granting states the right to make any reservations not
incompatible with the purpose of the treaty or explicitly prohibited by the treaty). See, for
example, 'The Fisbeies Jurisdiction Case" (United Kingdom v Icelana), 1973 ICJ 3, 34 (describing a
case where Iceland's earlier deal with the UK to recognize a tweleve-mile exclusive fisheries
jurisdiction was made moot by a change in international law where many countries decided to
automatically recognize a twelve-mile exclusive fisheries jurisdiction). The problem with upfront
payments is that states could be left with the hard decision of complying to its side of a treaty
bargain, even if a change in circumstances has made the bargain one-sided. More likely, the party
who ended up with the bad side of the bargain will breach.
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treaty concession." This would help assure other parties to the agreement that
all parties are committed to making the treaty last, encouraging them to build
reliance on the treaty as well. For example, when the developed countries
wanted to establish universally recognized deep-sea mining rights, they chose
not to negotiate a lump-sum payment of anticipated profits to the resistant
developing countries. Instead, the developed nations agreed to submit to an
International Seabed Authority that would distribute profits from deep-sea
mining to developing countries on an ongoing basis.39 Committing to
interdependent relationships or larger structures of international organization
can limit the range of options available to players in the negotiations in order to
incentivize cooperation.4 ° Additionally, countries may simply gain some
structural advantages from achieving greater economies of scale by pooling
resources, sharing information, or coordinating their actions. 41 Furthermore, by
building conceptual linkages between smaller obligations in a larger treaty
regime, the breaches that do occur can be "contained" without infecting the
health of the entire treaty. For example, if a party to the WTO violates another
party's right to nondiscrimination in a particular trade area, the breaching party
loses its right to nondiscrimination in a proportionate trade interest.42 Neither
party needs to lose its membership rights or lose the entirety of its
nondiscrimination rights. This pattern of action suggests that parties often have
an incentive to deal in smaller units, not only to gain the benefits of divisibility,
but also to gain the advantages of interdependence. Not all small-unit
agreements create interdependence (as the side payment example illustrates), but
some small-unit exchanges, by virtue of being linked to a larger scheme of
exchanges, facilitate long-term cooperation. Careful selection of those particular
smaller entitlements that build interdependence can incentivize parties to adhere
to the treaty for the long run.
38 Consider Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 Am
Econ Rev 519, 521 (1983) (suggesting that parties who make a sizeable investment into a long-
term project can signal to other parties that it will not breach the long-term agreement).
39 See UNCLOS, Arts 156-58 (cited in note 5) (establishing the International Seabed Authority, its
nature and fundamental principles, and its organs).
40 See Telser, 8 J Econ Perspectives at 159-60 (cited in note 12) (suggesting that forcing the
negotiating parties to pre-commit to certain relationships, such as vertical integration, can
constrain the range of profitable actions for these parties enough to resolve the problem of an
empty core).
41 See Commission of the European Communities, The Single Market: Review of Achievements (Nov 20,
2007), online at http://ec.europa.eu/citizensagenda/docs/sec_2007_1521_en.pdf (visited Nov
21, 2009) (cataloguing the many economic benefits that have resulted from unifying national
markets).
42 DSU, 1869 UN Treaty Ser 401 at Art 22, 3-4 (cited in note 25) (establishing the procedures for
determining liabilities for breach and appropriate retaliatory measures).
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B. Why is Interdependence an Advantage?: Some Differences
between Private Actors and States
It might seem counterintuitive to think of interdependence as an
advantage. Contract theory, for example, highly prizes the parties' ability to make
an efficient breach. 4' As such, courts rarely uphold contract clauses that provide
for excessive liquidated damages, for fear of seeming too punitive. 4 The law and
economics analysis in contract law focuses on the end goal of maximizing wealth
by allocating resources to the highest-valuing actor.45 To that end, contract
damages focus on forcing the breacher to internalize the costs to the aggrieved
party, so that the breacher only breaches when it is equal or better for both
parties to the contract.
46
However, the end goals and interests of countries may differ from the
interests of firms acting within a predictable legal system. First, countries cannot
rely on international courts to hold other countries to their treaty obligations.
Some countries, for example, do not submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of
permanent international courts such as the International Court of Justice (ICj).47
Though countries may voluntarily submit to tribunals or other dispute
settlement mechanisms, they often still hold enough political power to influence
outcomes post hoc, whether by selecting the judges, 4 threatening to damage the
credibility of the court by non-participation or by non-compliance with the
See Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 196-98 (cited in note 21) (suggesting that courts
should only enforce contracts as necessary to make cooperation in deferred, but otherwise
efficient, exchanges possible).
44 Id at 251-52 (summarizing why punitive damages are not favored in contract law).
45 Consider Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J Leg Stud 103 (1979)
(advocating wealth maximization as the goal of courts and the common law).
46 See Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 204-05 (cited in note 21) (illustrating the calculations
involved in detennining an efficient breach).
47 See Declarations Recogniing the Jurisdicion of the Court as Compulsory (2009), online at http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?pl=5&p2=l&p3=3 (visited Nov 21, 2009) (listing all of the
countries that recognize the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction). Notably, the US has withdrawn its
recognition after a series of unfavorable decisions, and does not currently appear on the list.
48 See, for example, Statute of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ Statute"), 59 Stat 1031, TS
993, Art 10 (1945) (requiring an absolute majority of votes in the Security Council, as well as the
General Assembly, for a candidate to be appointed judge).
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judgment,49 or simply refusing to submit to an unfavorable court's jurisdiction in
future disputes."0
Second, the lack of clear resolution to breach increases the cost of breach
by multiplying the uncertainties. There is no guarantee, for example, that a party
would not overreact to a breach and retaliate in a disproportionate, inefficient
way.5 There is no guarantee that a breaching party will agree to compensate for
the breach at all.52
Third, states parties to a treaty are necessarily linked by a long-term
relationship that will last as long as the countries exist. The treaty itself may
become obsolete or superseded by custom, but the distrust arising from one
breach can easily spill over to impede negotiations in a seemingly unrelated
agreement 3 or to sour diplomatic relations generally.
Fourth, the "self-interest" of nations differs from the "self-interest" of
individual firms or actors. Whereas an individual firm seeks to maximize profit
or, at most, has a fiduciary duty to enrich its shareholders, nations have a general
duty to safeguard public well-being and maintain order. Of course, this
49 See, for example, Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v Iran),
Judgment, 1980 ICJ 3 (May 24, 1980) (deploring the fact that Iran refused to show up to court to
defend itself and that the US acted unilaterally in trying to rescue hostages without waiting for
court permission).
50 See, for example, United States: Department of State Letter and Statement Concerning Termination of
Acceptance of ICJ Compulsoy Jurisdiction (Oct 7, 1985), 24 I1aM 1742, 1743 (1985) (terminating US
recognition of the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction after getting an unfavorable decision in a case
involving US backing of Nicaraguan insurgents).
51 See, for example, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Securitly and Human RightsforAll, Report of
the Secretary-General (Mar 21, 2005), UN Doc A/59/2005, 122-26 (2005) (supporting the
conclusion that NATO's peacekeeping attack on Kosovo was "illegal, yet legitimate").
52 However, the possibility that the state will ignore its international legal obligations should not be
overstated. See, for example, M/V Saiga (No 2) (St Vincent v Guinea), 120 ILR 143, 170 (Intl Trib
L of the Sea 1999) (observing that it is a "well-established rule of international law that a State
which suffers damage as a result of an internationally wrongful act by another State is entitled to
obtain reparation for the damage suffered from the State which committed the wrongful act and
that 'reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and
reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
committed' (Factoy at ChorZdw, Merits, Judgment No. 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 47).').
Even if the courts are powerless to enforce their judgments, there will still be consequences in the
form of damages for most violations where a treaty defines adjudicatory procedures in advance,
since it is not in the interest of the state to resort to self-help or ignore international pressure to
submit to the court.
53 For example, recipients of foreign aid may be concerned that their aid packages will be affected
unless they acquiesce to the aid-giving country's policy objectives. But see Economic Measures as a
Means of Political and Economic Coercion against Developing Countries, UN Doc A/RES/50/96 2
(1995) (reaffirming that unilateral coercive economic measures that are "not authorized by
relevant organs of the United Nations or are inconsistent with the principles contained in the
Charter of the United Nations" are not allowed).
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responsibility does not prevent states from also thinking about how its interest
groups may profit from a favorable trade treaty or territorial agreement. Even
so, states are responsible for regulating themselves in the international order in a
way that individual firms or actors are not.5" When a private actor breaches a
contract, this does nothing to de-legitimate the legal order underlying the
contract. The law will affirm its authority by enforcing the proper penalties for
the breach. However, when a state breaches a treaty, it threatens the legitimacy
of the international order, because a tenet of international law only has as much
force as custom and the nations' self-discipline are willing to provide.55 When
enough nations violate a treaty, custom may change the treaty's status as law.56
There must be some means of internalizing the large externalities incurred
by the international community when a breaching state harms a long-term
relationship or detracts from the law's credibility. Since increasing damages ex
post to reflect these externalities seems unworkable (given the uncertainty
involved in enforcing such judgments), these "interdependent" structural
commitments may be a way for parties to build deterrence incentives into the
text of the agreement itself.5" Once states can be properly incentivized to adhere
to the treaty, the treaty is able to use this inertia to gain legitimacy and build
reliance on the treaty. While contract theory may seek to discourage
unreasonable reliance, treaty-makers would want to encourage states to adjust
their local bureaucracies to the treaty regime, build long-term policy goals based
on the treaty's implications, and empower those domestic interest groups that
are best poised to take advantage of the treaty's benefits.5 8 Treaty negotiators
54 See, for example, United Nations Charter, Arts 33-37 (defining the duty of UN member
countries to settle disputes peacefully); see also id, Art 2 (preventing members from using force or
threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state); Case
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US), Merits, 1986
ICJ 14, T 187 (1986) (observing that Article 2(4) of the UN Charter now also applies to non-
members because it has acquired the status of customary international law).
55 See Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice 35-37 (Martinus Nijhoff 1991)
(describing the legal positivist's view of international law, that law is merely the ability to give
effect to the nations' "political wills").
56 See Grigory Tunkin, Is General International Law Customary Law Only?, 4 EurJ Ind L 534, 540 (1993)
(observing that treaties that are changed by subsequent practice are now common, especially in
bilateral treaties, where it only takes the actions of two parties to change the norm).
57 Consider Nysten-Haarala, The Long-Term Contract at 224-25 (cited in note 35) (discussing Oliver
Williamson's view that "[1]egal rules can never sanction all dishonesty and cheating, and sanctions
cannot always repair the damage," and suggesting that requiring parties to invest "credible
commitments" to their long-term joint projects will help build loyalty and trust where the law
cannot).
58 For a useful analogy, consider Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democrag: Constitutions, Commitment, and
International Law, 38 NYU J Intl L & Polit 707, 712 (2006) (noting that building in certain
international law commitments into a nation's new constitution can help "lock in" democracy by
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would want countries to invest in a dispute resolution system by getting advance
commitments to submit to the adjudicating body's jurisdiction. If parties could
commit to using adjudicatory channels to clarify legal obligations rather than
diplomatic or self-help channels, then the states parties to the treaties could
benefit from the creation of new law as well as the increasing legitimacy of the
court.5 9 Given the difficulty of exacting precise penalties for breaches and the
ease with which a breach can damage the relations between nations, it makes
sense to negotiate treaties that structure entitlements in an interdependent way
that makes the costs of breach prohibitive. Such treaties would help states
internalize the potential instability costs of a breach.
II. TREATY NEGOTIATION: THE EXCHANGE OF SMALLER,
INTERDEPENDENT UNITS IN PRACTICE
Although the idea of the "smaller, interdependent unit of exchange" can
apply to private contracts as well as treaties between states, it is especially useful
to trace the effect of using smaller, interdependent units through the lens of
public international law for two reasons. First, treaties help test the internal
strength of the negotiated terms when they are left to their own devices. Since
there is no official inter-state governance to enforce the contract,60 the treaty
must provide its own systems of private ordering and disincentives for breach.6
empowering the right interest groups). In democratic forms of government, an institution can
ensure its long-term entrenchment by empowering interest groups, who will, in turn, build
expertise in the institution and lobby to strengthen the institution. The strengthened institution
can then further empower the interest group. Similarly, I propose that there can be such a positive
feedback loop in international institutions as well, where a successful treaty can pave the way for
its future entrenchment by encouraging parties to invest in the system and rely on the order
imposed by the institution to obtain benefits, rather than seeking elsewhere. As more states
parties accede to a successful international system, the costs of setting up a competing system and
attracting a critical mass of supporters will become increasingly prohibitive.
59 Note that this presents a positive externality problem. Although the community at large may
benefit from the clarification of law and the increased legitimacy of the court or arbitral panel as it
resolves more disputes, the parties in the dispute would pay all the actual costs. Given this added
cost, parties may have no desire to submit to the jurisdiction of the court when they can settle out
of court. Perhaps one solution to this would be to grant a kind of "qualified immunity" to first-
time offenders who help clarify an issue of first impression. The winning party would still have
the international equivalent of a declaratory judgment or an advisory opinion to help sway
diplomatic negotiations its way, while the losing party would be able to save face and not be
found formally liable for a treaty breach.
60 Consider John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 201 (Noonday 1954) (arguing that
international law is not "positive law" because it does not answer to a sovereign, and that any
duties imposed by international law must ultimately be enforced through moral sanctions).
61 Consider Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J Leg
Pluralism 1, 23 (1981) (theorizing that parties who form contracts are operating under "law in the
shadow of indigenous ordering"). In the contract context, the agreement is supported by private
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Second, the lack of a credible world court and states' interest in long-term
cooperative relationships detracts from the rationale behind an "efficient
breach." Given the current interconnectedness of the world economy, the ease
of transportation, and the easy access to information, countries no longer have
the luxury simply not to deal with one another. Treaties can help illustrate how
rational actors behave when they are forced into long-term relationships and
how a system may adjust to internalize the harms to trust and the rule of law
created by breach. In order to study these effects across different areas of
international law, I present two case studies: one based on territorial disputes
and the other based on trade regulation.
A. Territorial Disputes Case Study: The UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea
UNCLOS was negotiated out of a sudden shift in the customary
international law regarding states' territorial rights to the seas. Traditionally,
customary international law had held that the high seas (three nautical miles, or a
cannon's shot, away from the shore) were mare liberum, open to all and belonging
to none.62 The US set the world in disequilibrium in 1945 when President
Truman issued a proclamation that the US now owned the mineral resources on
its continental shelf seabed.63 Rather than protesting, many other countries
acquiesced to the standard and made similar claims extending their territorial
rights further into the sea.64 Concerns over the rapid land grab came to a head
when Arvid Pardo, the Maltese Ambassador to the UN, raised before the
General Assembly the issue of whether countries could reserve parts of the
order and the threat of law; in the treaty context, the threat of enforcement under the law may not
be as strong, but the same concept of "private ordering" can explain how treaties are able to
maintain compliance.
62 See Hugo Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas 7 (Oxford 1916) (Ralph Van Deman Magoffin, trans)
(establishing the principle of mare liberum); see also Winston C. Extavour, The Excusive Economic
Zone 15 (Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales 1978) (tracing the eighteenth
century origins of the three-mile "cannon shot" rule for defining the boundaries of territorial
waters).
63 Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, Presidential Proclamation 2667, 10
Fed Reg 12303 (Sept 28, 1945) (presidential proclamation that the US now owns the mineral
resources in its continental shelf seabed).
64 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave 213 (Columbia 2d ed 1979) (noting that sovereign rights to the
continental shelf quickly became recognized as customary law, even before the nations had an
opportunity to codify the norm through the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, 499 UN
Treaty Set 311, TIAS No 5578 (1958)).
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ocean floor beyond their jurisdictions for commercial purposes.65 Although
previous conventions had already agreed on various limits for territorial claims
over the sea,66 Pardo's speech, which speculated on the technical feasibility of
deep-sea mining in the near future,67 ignited the imaginations of developing
countries eager to share in the "common heritage" of the ocean floor.66 As a
result, there was a sharp division between the developing nations, who felt
entitled to share in the potential wealth from deep-sea mining but constrained by
their lack of technology and capital,69 and the developed nations, who also
wanted to lay claims to deep-sea mining rights, but found that any bid for
international recognition of these rights to exclude would be blocked by the
more numerous developing-nation voting bloc.
70
In 1973, representatives met in New York for the Third UN Conference
on the Law of the Sea in order to iron out these differences. 7' Three of the main
65 UN GAOR, 22d Sess, 1515th mtg at 1, UN Doc A/C.1/PV.1515 (1967) (raising the issue of
whether countries could reserve parts of the ocean flood beyond their jurisdictions for
commercial purposes).
66 See, for example, Convention on the High Seas, 450 UN Treaty Set 82 (1958); Convention on the
Territorial Seas and the Contiguous Zone, 15 UST 1606, 516 UN Treaty Ser 205 (1958);
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, 17 UST 138,
559 UN Treaty Ser 285 (1958).
67 UN GAOR, 22nd Sess, 1515th mtg at 5 (cited at note 65) (statement of Ambassador Pardo)
(asserting that "[n]ational appropriation and commercial exploitation of the mineral resources of
the ocean floor ... are imminent").
68 Id ("If the mineral resources lying on the ocean floor are incredibly vast, equally vast are the
resources lying below the floor's surface. We know little about the presence of vein deposits, yet
they must in all likelihood exist... .'). See also Henkin, How Nations Behave at 226 (cited in note
64) (surmising that Pardo's ill-timed move of opening the law of the sea to change at a time of
increasing small-country nationalism probably resulted in an international grab at immediate gains
at the expense of the "common heritage" of the seas); Caitlyn L. Antrim, Converting Competition to
Collaboration: Creative Applications of Models in the Law of the Sea Negotiations, in Avenhaus and
Zartman, Diplomagy Games at 227 (cited in note 1) (relating how an MIT study on the feasibility
and profitability of deep sea mining revealed that the developing countries' estimates of
profitability were overly optimistic).
69 UN GAOR, 22d Sess, 1515th mtg at 8-9 (cited at note 65) (statement of Ambassador Pardo)
("The wording of the [Continental Shelf] Convention, whatever may have been the intentions of
its authors, provides powerful legal encouragement to the political, economic, and military
considerations that are inexorably impelling technologically advanced States to appropriate the
sea-bed and ocean floor beyond the 200-metre isobath for their own use.").
70 In fact, there was more opposing the developed countries' attempt to claim territory than the
coalition of developing nations. Politically, it was inexpedient to claim proprietary rights to
portions of the sea, and the General Assembly eventually passed a resolution proclaiming the
seabed to be beyond national jurisdiction and the "common heritage of mankind." UN Doc
A/RES/2749 (XXV) (cited in note 28).
71 See Reservation exclusively for the peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the
subsoil thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction and use
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issues of contention included the scope of territorial waters, ownership of the
seabed beyond territorial waters, and the right of transit.12 The developed
nations wanted recognition of rights to exploit the ocean floor, while developing
and landlocked nations wanted a share of the ocean mining profits.7 3 Coastal
developing nations sought to extend their exclusive economic rights beyond
traditional territorial waters, 4 but developed nations with large maritime forces
feared that such expansion of territorial claims to the sea would result in
impeded navigation for their navies.7"
Countries were able to reach consensus on the 1982 UNCLOS largely as a
result of the "package deal" mechanism, a consensus-building strategy that the
conferences on the Law of the Sea helped popularize.7 6 This mechanism is a
prime example of how parties sought to trade in smaller units while making
these exchanges contingent on an interdependent relationship (in this case, the
"package deal").77 For example, maritime superpowers and poorer coastal
nations could not agree on an appropriate boundary for the territorial sea, where
the coastal state would enjoy absolute sovereignty and exclusive economic
rights.78 Rather than thinking of territorial rights over coastal seas in indivisible
terms of "absolute sovereignty," the 1982 Convention solved this impasse by
splitting up the rights to navigate, exploit natural resources, and enforce rules.
of their resources in the interests of mankind, and convening of a conference on the law of the
sea, UN Doc A/RES/3029 (XXVIJ) (Dec 18, 1972) (setting the dates and purpose of the first
session).
72 See Katherine Hill and Zachary Wales, An Interiew with Gudmundur Eiriksson, 59 J Intl Affairs 43,
44 (2005) ("A major aspect was the debate over narrow zones, which are somewhat linked to
territorial shipping rights, navigation rights and resource rights."). See also Henkin, How Nations
Behave at 217, 219 (cited in note 64).
73 Henkin, How Nations Behave at 50 (cited in note 64) (observing that initial efforts tried to give
special rights to landlocked and other "geographically disadvantaged" countries, who could not
have as ready access to deep sea mining ventures).
74 Id at 216 (observing that the developing nations had built a strong coalition by employing the
rhetoric of "economic self-determination" and characterizing the act of other states mining and
fishing in their "patrimonial seas" as "economic imperialism").
75 Id at 219 (noting that extending the territorial sea to twelve miles would convert important
international waterways into territorial sea).
76 See G. Plant, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Preparatoy Commission:
Models for United-Nations Law-Making?, 36 Inl & Comp L Q 525, 525, 528 (1987) (noting that the
concept of passive consensus procedure is "as old as primitive law" and that the concept of
negotiating trade-offs is a familiar one in diplomacy, but suggesting that the UNCLOS
conferences employed a new type of "active consensus" strategy which involved extensive
"package deal" trade-offs between functionally unrelated issues).
77 See Hill and Wales, 59 J Intl Affairs at 45 (cited in note 72) ("Since all of these issues were
negotiated simultaneously, it was decided early on that it wouldn't be possible for a country to
elect to participate in to some areas and not others.").
78 See Henkin, How Nations Behave at 217 (cited in note 64).
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Article 3 of UNCLOS provided that the "territorial sea" of coastal states could
extend twelve nautical miles from the shore, 9 granted an additional twelve-
nautical-mile zone called the "contiguous zone" where the coastal state could
take measures to enforce its customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws. 0
Article 3 also granted a generous two-hundred-nautical-mile zone called the
"exclusive economic zone" (EEZ) where the coastal state would have exclusive
rights to exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing natural resources.8' In
exchange for the wide scope of economic rights granted to the coastal nations,
the powerful maritime states were able to negotiate a comparably wide range of
navigational rights, including the right of innocent passage through all territorial
seas 82 and a right of transit passage through straits used for international
navigation. 83
The controversy regarding deep-sea mining was resolved similarly, by
forcing a proportionate division of seabed claims between the developing
nations and the developed nations. An equitable division of property rights over
the ocean floor seemed impossible, since the developed nations had the
technology (theoretically) and the capital to benefit from the ocean floor, and
the developing nations did not. 84 Instead, the treaty envisioned that developing
countries would get a right to a share of the profits, even if those countries
could not directly take advantage of the deep-sea mining rights themselves.8"
Every time a national enterprise sought to claim an area of seabed, it would have
to present two sites to the International Seabed Authority. The International
Seabed Authority would then choose the one it deemed better, 86 and an organ
79 UNCLOS, Art 3 (cited in note 5) (defining the breadth of the territorial sea).
80 Id at Art 33 (defining the sea's contiguous zone).
8 Id at Art 55 (defining the specific legal regime of the exclusive economic zone of the sea).
82 Id at Arts 18-19 (defining sea passage and innocent passage).
83 UNCLOS, Arts 38-39 (cited in note 5) (defining the right of transit passage and the duties of
ships and aircraft during transit passage).
84 Henkin, How Nalions Behave at 221 (cited in note 64). As it turns out, no one currently has the
technology to exploit the ocean floor. See Hill and Wales, 59 J Intl Affairs at 48 (cited in note 72)
(reflecting in hindsight that the deep sea mining venture was economically non-viable, given
contemporary technology).
85 Hill and Wales, 59 J Intl Affairs at 48 (cited in note 72) ("The compromise between developed
and developing nations was that there would be a shared responsibility, a dual system, and
individual countries that wanted to exploit deep sea minerals would do so on a parallel basis,
sharing the revenues of any mining operation with the international community.").
86 Young, Equity at 4-5 (cited in note 3) (describing the formulation and purposes of organs to
implement deep sea mining). But see Brains and Taylor, Fair Division at 17-18 (cited in note 31)
(noting that the "one divides, the other chooses" method tends to systematically favor the divider,
because she can choose what she knows about the chooser's preferences to get far more than fifty
percent of the subjective valued prize).
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called the Enterprise would develop the seabed site and distribute profits, with
the technological support of the developed nations."
Not only did UNCLOS employ the concept of the "smaller unit," it also
deliberately structured these exchanges to foster interdependent relationships
between the developing and developed nations.88 First, it prohibited states from
attaching reservations, derogating unilaterally, or entering into incompatible inter
se agreements."9 These prohibitions would help preserve the "package deal" that
the states agreed on during the Third Conference.9" Such provisions would
preserve the exact pairing of compromises made on each side, so that parties
could owe obligations to one another even on conceptually unrelated issues.91
Second, UNCLOS divided up entitlements in a way that still forces parties to
cooperate with one another in order to enjoy their rights. When breaches occur,
the states parties will find that self-help is not worth their while: since UNCLOS
was negotiated at such high costs92 and ties so many interests together, states
would generally find it cost-efficient to submit to an international tribunal and
risk paying monetary damages.93 However, even if a gross breach of the treaty
87 Henkin, How Nations Behave at 221 (cited in note 64) ("The right to exploit was divided between
national enterprise and a new international enterprise run essentially by the developing states, with
the developed states giving the international enterprise the capital and technology it would need in
order to get started on one set of mining operations.").
88 Consider UNCLOS, preamble at 1 (cited in note 5) (acknowledging that the problems of ocean
space are "closely interrelated" and "need to be considered as a whole').
89 Alan Boyle, Further Development of the Law of the Sea Convention: Mechanisms for Change, 54 Intl &
Comp L Q 563, 563 (2005) (citing UNCLOS) ("[l]ts provisions form an integral whole, protected
from derogation by compulsory third-party settlement of disputes, a prohibition on reservations,
and a ban on incompatible interse agreements.").
90 Hill and Wales, 59 J Intl Affairs at 45 (cited in note 72). Without these UNCLOS clauses
protecting the "package deal," current international law would permit states to place reservations
or selectively accede to only the provisions favorable to it, defeating the whole compromise. See
Vienna Convention, 1155 UN Treaty Ser 331, Arts 2(1)(d), 19 (cited in note 37).
91 For example, the right of transit and innocent passage is conceptually linked to the right to
expanded exclusive economic zones (EEZ), since the expansion of the EEZ could impede the
other party's exercise of its navigational rights. However, there is no readily apparent conceptual
reason why the right to engage in deep sea mining should be linked to the right to an expanded
EEZ. Yet, since these provisions reflect a larger balance of compromises between the developed
nations and the developing nations, countries may feel politically obligated to respect these rights.
92 Negotiations spanned for almost a decade. Compare UN Doc A/RES/3029 (XXVII) at $ 3 (cited
in note 71) (setting the first meeting at 1973) with United Nations, The Convention and Agreements
(Feb 21, 2009), online at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/conventionagreements/
convention-agreements.htm (visited on Nov 6, 2009) (indicating that UNCLOS was not
implemented until 1994).
93 See, for example, MI V Saiga (No 2), 120 ILR 143, at 167-82 (cited in note 52) (awarding a
standard calculation of compensatory damages for a violation of the UNCLOS provisions on
releasing foreign vessels upon bail).
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should occur and even if the states parties should fail to submit to the prescribed
dispute settlement mechanism, 94 the internal linkages in the UNCLOS treaty
could disincentivize parties from retaliating disproportionately and help contain
the breach to a limited scope. For example, the right to an expansive exclusive
economic zone and the right of innocent passage and transit passage necessarily
anticipate that these two uses of the sea will coexist in the same space. If Nation
A fails to restrain its fishing boats from wandering into Nation B's EEZ, and
attempts to settle the matter at court fail, the Nation B could reciprocate by
refusing the right of innocent passage to Nation A's ships. Because these rights
have been negotiated as smaller units of a larger whole, it is easier to be
proportionate in retaliation. Because these rights are closely coordinated with
one another, it is easier to establish the causal link between the right that is
breached and the self-help remedy applied.
A second example: rather than giving ocean floor mining rights to
developed nations with no strings attached, UNCLOS requires developed
nations to enter into a long-term cooperative relationship with the International
Seabed Authority.9" This example illustrates why a long-term relationship may be
preferable to an upfront side payment, or even an ongoing fee. First, part of the
problem with an upfront side payment to the developing nations was that
estimates of future profits from deep-sea mining were preliminary and
speculative. 96 An early side payment could result in a windfall for the developing
nations if the viable technology for deep-sea mining turned out to be over a half-
century away, or it could turn into a steal if it turned out that a technology
breakthrough was imminent. To make matters worse, developing nations
overestimated the profitability of these ventures, while the developed nations
kept to conservative estimates.97 Structuring the side payment to be an ongoing
arrangement, expressed as a percentage of the actual profits, would help alleviate
these uncertainties in valuation. Even then though, a developing nation might
worry that if the mining operations become too profitable, the far more
powerful developed nations would renegotiate the side payments or simply
94 See UNCLOS, Arts 286-88 (cited in note 5) (prescribing the proper procedures for resolving
disputes arising under UNCLOS and authorizing certain international tribunals and courts to hear
UNCLOS cases).
95 Final Act of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (1982), Annex I, Resolution II,
online at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/cnvention-agreements/texts/final-act eng'pdf (visited
Nov 21, 2009).
96 Antrim, Converting Competition to Collaboration: Creative Applications of Models in the Law of the Sea
Negotialions, in Avenhaus and Zartman, Diplomagy Games at 219-20 (cited in note 68) (indicating
that the MIT model presented to negotiators used the best estimates of industry experts at the
time, but that there were many unknown variables).
97 Id at 227.
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choose to invest more in their navies and less in sustaining an old compromise.
The best solution seems to be to require the developed nations to make a long-
term capital investment in an international mining enterprise that would
distribute its profits to the developing nations. By establishing this obligation
while the prospects of future mining profits are uncertain, the developing
nations can ensure that the developed nations will be more likely to cooperate in
the international enterprise. Committing to early development and ongoing
funding of the international enterprise helps ensure that the developing nations'
enterprise keeps apace with the developed nations' mining infrastructure.
The problem with side payments is that money is often too liquid of an
asset. The smallness of the unit of exchange is not enough to guarantee a
smooth trade. Because money is so easy to convert into other forms of value, it
is not a credible commitment mechanism.98 For parties who cannot always rely
on a centralized dispute settlement mechanism, incentives that come from
within are crucial to keeping the agreement alive. Joint investments into
infrastructure, a network of conceptually related rights, and means of containing
the breach with proportionate retaliation all help build incentives to preserve the
ongoing relationship between the contracting parties. The fact that a large
network of interdependent obligations and rights is composed of smaller units
of entitlements functions as a stopgap that prevents comparatively minor
breaches from becoming larger issues, by offering incremental means of
retaliating proportionately. Meanwhile, interdependent commitments, such as
joint investments and mutually dependent rights, help inflate the cost of major
breaches to help parties internalize the high transaction costs of renegotiating
ignored treaties, the costs to international order caused by breach, and the
damage done to the parties' long-term relationship. The inflexibility of a treaty
(created by clauses that prevent reservations, unilateral derogations, and the like)
also has the effect of giving priority to the provisions of those treaties over the
provisions of more flexible treaties.99 This seems to be good evidence that states
behave rationally even when they decide to breach, taking into account the high
costs of unsettling interdependent commitments and negotiating institutional
change when carefully selecting which treaties to modify or breach.
98 Consider Williamson, 73 Am Econ Rev at 519-20 (cited in note 38) (arguing that contract theory
takes an unnecessarily centralized, court-dependent focus, and that the use of "credible
commitments," like giving a hostage to the other side or making a big investment in
infrastructure, helps create a private ordering that enforces prior agreements). Similarly, here, the
developed nations were asked to commit a "hostage" to the developing nations: they must invest
in the international mining enterprise in order to gain legal recognition of their private enterprises.
99 See Plant, 36 Intl & Comp L Q at 566 (cited in note 76) (likening UNCLOS' inflexibility to the
inflexibility of a "Constitution," and noting that "on its own terms it enjoys a strong degree of
pre-eminence over other treaties by virtue of its integral status.').
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Negotiating issues in a piecemeal, "tit-for-tat" way may have special
negative consequences in international law, however. Because widely accepted
"ccustoms" can be as legally authoritative as treaties in international law, ° it can
become difficult to arrange "package deals" when one of the coalitions uses
what is already a widely recognized right as a bargaining chip to negotiate the
recognition of a more controversial right. For example, many coastal countries,
even those that were not part of the developing nations' coalition, favored the
idea of an expansive EEZ, and enough countries had accepted the idea of the
expansive EEZ for the concept to become recognized as customary
international law, even for those countries that chose not to ratify UNCLOS. 101
As such, evolving international custom provided a way for non-party states to
avoid the package deal that conditioned recognition of EEZ rights to submitting
to UNCLOS' deep-sea mining provisions. The US, for example, currently claims
a two-hundred-nautical-mile EEZ, even though it is not a party to UNCLOS.1 °2
This surprising turn of events does not detract from the idea that states should
negotiate in smaller, interdependent units, however. It simply serves as a
reminder to negotiators that the rights they bring to the table must be carefully
selected to add to whatever rights that are already (or soon will be) recognized
under international custom. As economists have long recognized through core
theory, interdependent commitments can only exist where the right cannot exist
apart from that cooperative relationship. 103
100 See ICJ Statute, Art 38, 1 (cited in note 48) (stating that "international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law" is an acceptable source of international law); see also
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 102(1) (1987) (stating
that "[a] rule of international law is one that has been accepted as such by the international
community of states in the form of customary law," "by international agreement," or "by
derivation from general principles common to the major legal systems").
101 Case Concerning Delimitaion of the Maritime Boundagy in the Guff of Maine Area (Canada v U), 1984 ICJ
246, 294 (Oct 12, 1984) (noting that though several states do not seem inclined to ratify
UNCLOS, this "in no way detracts from the consensus reached on large portions of the
instrument."); see also Case Concerning Passage Through the Great Belt (Finland v Denmark) (provisional
measures), 1991 ICJ 12, 13 auly 29, 1991) (noting that certain provisions of UNCLOS now
reflect customary law).
102 Reagan Proclamation, 83 Dept State Bull No 2075 at 70-71 (1983) (declaring that the US will
adhere to the EEZ limits recognized by existing maritime practice, which also happen to be the
limits set by UNCLOS).
103 See Telser, 8 J Econ Perspectives at 152 (cited in note 12) (explaining the core principle that "any
coalition of traders will only participate in the market as a whole if and only if they can do at least
as well as they could off by themselves in their own coalition.").
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B. A Trade Agreement Case Study: The World Trade
Organization
In 1994, states participating in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations
concluded the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, which required
states parties to the treaty to adhere to the new General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS).10 4 As in the UNCLOS agreement, there had been a fundamental rift
during negotiations between the developed nations and the developing
nations. 105 Initially, developing countries were reluctant to agree to TRIPS, since
they were more likely to be second-comers, and the developed countries would
have the technology and the capital to gain the larger part of TRIPS' benefits." 6
Developed countries also had pressure from domestic interest groups to
maintain protectionist policies for their manufacturing and agricultural
industries.' Developed and developing countries also had to reconcile conflicts
between import-dependent and export-dependent interests,0 8 and coordinate
their domestic trade and intellectual property policies to the WTO's minimum
standards.'0 9 However, two strategies in particular, which involved the use of
"smaller, interdependent units," helped form the basis of consensus for the
WTO agreements.
04 Marrakesh Agreement, 1867 UN Treaty Ser 154 at Art 2, 2 (cited in note 9).
105 Meir Perez Pugatch, The International Political Economy of Intellectual Properly R ghts 49 (Edward Elgar
2004) (observing that developing countries had little to gain from a liberalized international
intellectual property regime, which would open domestic products to foreign competition).
106 But consider J. Michael Finger and Philip Schuler, Poor People's Knowledge (Oxford 2004)
(describing various ways that the current regime could uniquely improve the wealth of developing
nations, by granting intellectual property rights to traditional craft, ethnobotanical knowledge, and
intangible cultural heritage such as folklore, native art, and agricultural techniques).
107 See Christina Davis, International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade
Liberalization, 98 Am Pol Sci Rev 153, 164 (2004) (noting that issue linkages can build coalitions to
overcome interest group opposition).
108 See Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the
GATTI WTO, 56 Intl Org 339, 345 (2002) (noting that the benefit of accessing a foreign market
would come with the cost of opening its domestic market to others, but that the opportunity cost
of losing access to a market was smaller for large economies, giving them the upper hand in the
negotiations).
109 See Jerome H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection under the
TRIPS Component of the WITO Agreement, in Carlos M. Correa and Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, eds,
Intellectual Property and International Trade. The TRIPS Agreement 24-25 (Aspen 2008) (reasoning that
the universal minimum standards imposed by TRIPS was a means of protecting the developed
countries' comparative advantage in the production of intellectual goods, in order to balance out
the comparative advantage that developing nations had recently gained in manufacturing
traditional industrial products).
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1. Cross-issue linkages.
The WTO created cross-issue package deals between several different areas
of trade in order to cement a general consensus. 10 These linkages take advantage
of the "smaller, interdependent unit" concept in several ways. For example, the
negotiators of the Uruguay Round showed willingness to uncouple specific trade
issues from a larger agricultural policy agenda, third-world redistribution agenda,
or tariff policy. Previously, when countries had engaged in single-sector
negotiations, countries were not able to achieve greater trade liberalization."' By
contrast, the Uruguay Round negotiations isolated specific concessions, such as
the phase-out of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (a quota system limiting textiles
exports from developing countries)" 2 and the continuation of the Generalized
System of Preferences (preferential tariff-cutting to developing country
exports)," 3 outside of their normal context as one part of a larger textile policy
or protectionist agricultural policy. Breaking up this issue from the larger policy
(in other words, using a smaller unit of negotiation) allowed the negotiators to
mix and match these concessions with other concessions from unrelated policy
areas, such as intellectual property rights (in other words, building
interdependence between the issues being negotiated). In this particular linkage
deal, for example, WTO negotiators envisioned that developing countries would
get apparel and agriculture liberalization, while developed countries would use
this concession to leverage a global minimum standard of international
intellectual property protection.14 By implicating more trade areas in the deal,
the negotiators could mobilize a greater number of domestic interest groups to
110 As in UNCLOS, the use of package deals meant that countries could not sign on to one party of
the treaty without signing on to the whole package. See Marrakesh Agreement, 1867 UN Treaty
Ser 154 (cited in note 9) (compelling all states parties to sign on to TRIPS, GATT, and GATS,
and only leaving certain plurilateral agreements optional).
I11 See Davis, 98 Am Pol Sci Rev at 159 (cited in note 107) (suggesting that the agendas of the US-
Japan talks on beef and citrus and the US-EU talks on wine were much more protectionist
because they were single-sector negotiations that focused exclusively on agricultural products).
112 Alice J.H. Wohn, Comment, Towards GATE Integration: Circumventing Quantitative Restrictions on
Textiles and Apparel Trade under the Muli-Fiber Arrangement, 22 U Pa J Ind Econ L 375, 378 n 14
(2001) (noting the developing nations' disappointment on hindsight that the phase-out of the
Multi-Fiber Arrangement they negotiated with the developed nations was not worth the
intellectual property concessions they gave in return).
113 D. Robert Webster and Christopher D. Bussert, The Revised Generalized System of Preferences: 'Tnstant
Replay" orReal Change?, 6 NWJ Intl L & Bus 1035, 1037 (1985) (explaining the historical origins of
the Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP") in US domestic law and analyzing how the GSP
benefits developing countries).
114 Michael P. Ryan, The Function-Specjfic and Linkage-Bargain Diplomay of International Intellectual Propery
Lawmaking, 19 U Pa J Ind Econ L 535, 541-42 (1998) (noting that previous negotiations were not
able to achieve such bargains because intellectual property negotiations were handled separately
from trade negotiations, through WIPO and GATT, respectively).
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counter the fallout from the negative concession."1 Furthermore, as the final
"package deal" grew to encompass the domain of several different government
departments and agencies, it became far less likely that any interest-group-
controlled policymaker could successfully veto the final outcome as contrary to
domestic policy.
Part of the problem with single policy negotiations is that, too often, both
sides want similar, mutually incompatible concessions. For example, the
agricultural interest groups in both countries would want protective tariffs
against foreign goods and unimpeded access to foreign markets. Establishing
conceptual ties between previously unrelated policy areas would help countries
settle on concessions that affect different issue areas and, therefore, are not
mutually exclusive. Making concessions across policy areas also helps create win-
win situations that take into account the comparative advantage of each country
and the differences in relative value of concession between the party making the
concession and the party receiving it.'16 There would be ongoing incentives for
parties to keep their commitments, because the negotiating history would give a
credible rationale for why the textile policy of one country could plausibly and
justifiably affect the intellectual property rights of the other country. This sort of
interdependence cannot happen without isolating smaller issues from broader
national policies, because it is much harder to displace entire national policies
rather than to mix and match smaller concessions.
2. Institutional coordination
Once the states parties had succeeded in all of the cross-issue micro-
balancing, there needed to be a mechanism to maintain these linkages and
concessions in their proper proportion. The Marrakesh Agreement addressed
this need by establishing a formal Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which had
the power to determine liability and coordinate states parties' retaliatory
measures when a breach occurs."'
115 See Davis, 98 Am Pol Sci Rev at 157 (cited in note 107) (proposing that cross-sector linkages in
trade liberalization deals could offset the disapproval of agricultural lobbies by appealing to the
industrial and service sector interest groups).
116 For example, giving legal recognition for a country's biological patents will be a more valuable
concession for a technologically advanced party to receive than for the technologically behind
party to give. Similarly, a country that is already transitioning into service-oriented industries may
find that eliminating tariffs for manufactured goods and agricultural products is a small
concession to make, while a developing nation may find this a very valuable concession to get.
117 Marrakesh Agreement, 1867 UN Treaty Ser 154 at Art 3, 3 (cited in note 9); consider DSU,
1869 UN Treaty Ser 401 at Art 22 (cited in note 25) (establishing the procedures for determining
liabilities for breach and appropriate retaliatory measures).
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A previous form of GATT predating the WTO had existed from 1947,118
but it had never implemented a permanent, formal administrative structure.'1 9
Because of this lack of a coordinating body, developed nations prior to 1994
were able to bully developing nations that did not comply with the desired
intellectual property standards, using their large markets as leverage. For
example, the US often used the General System of Preferences policy (granting
preferential treatment to certain countries) to impose trade consequences on
countries that had intellectual property standards it deemed inadequate) 2 ° The
US could impose tariffs on selected imports as retaliation for other countries'
perceived breaches of intellectual property rights, under Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974,121 and in some cases the US was even able to change foreign
legislation on intellectual property rights, despite strong domestic opposition in
the foreign country to the new regime."' Given the unpredictability and
unilateral nature of retaliatory measures based on power politics, the developing
nations had an incentive to submit to a coordinating international infrastructure,
such as the DSB, even if they might not have liked the stricter TRIPS, GATT,
and GATS regimes that came with the DSB. 2 3 As a part of the deal, the US
agreed to submit all WTO-based Section 301 complaints to the WTO's DSB.1
2 4
The DSB owes its success in part to the highly interdependent system of
concessions established during the Uruguay Round negotiations. The Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO provides that a state party who
has suffered from a treaty breach may, after an appropriate finding of liability by
118 Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Oct 30,
1947), 55 UN Treaty Ser 308 (implementing the original 1947 GATT treaty, which itself was
never officially entered into force).
119 John H. Jackson, William J. Davey, and Alan 0. Sykes, Legal Problems of International Economic
Relations 289 (West 3d ed 1995) (noting that an ad hoc coordinating system developed despite the
lack of a formal mechanism).
120 Pugatch, The International Political Economy of Intellectual Propery Rights at 66 (cited in note 105).
12 1 Trade Act of 1974, 19 USC § 2411 et seq (2007).
122 See, for example, Pugatch, The International Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rbghts at 67 (cited
in note 105) (explaining how the US was able to pressure South Korea to grant patent rights to
pharmaceutical products, rather than processes, despite strong opposition from the Korean
Pharmaceutical Association and the Korean Publishers' Association).
123 See Robert E. Hudec, Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement, in Friedl Weiss and
Jochern Wiers, eds, Improving WPTO Dispute Settlement Procedures 369 (2000) (describing how the
majority of Uruguay Round participants, who originally wanted compliance with WTO remedy
awards to be on a voluntary basis, quickly changed their minds once the US began to enforce
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the DSB, seek permission to suspend its concessions.125 To put it another way,
the DSB gives permission to the offended party to engage in self-help. For
example, Antigua submitted a complaint to the DSB in 2003, arguing that the
US had violated GATS when it banned Internet gambling sites based in Antigua
from servicing American gamblers, without also banning certain state-approved
horseracing gambling sites based in the US. The DSB determined that this was
discriminatory, and permitted Antigua to suspend its obligations to the US under
the TRIPS agreement. 126  Here, as in UNCLOS, the use of smaller,
interdependent issue linkages helped contain breaches to their appropriate
scope. The DSU requires any suspension of concessions or obligations to be
proportional to the breach, and instructs the retaliating party to get advance
permission from the DSB confirming that the countermeasures are
appropriate. 127 This sort of partial suspension of treaty obligations would not be
possible if the WTO agreements had not been structured, from the beginning, as
a system of small, artificially linked compromises. Because the issues are severable
from the overall WTO deal, a breach does not unravel the entire agreement.
Because the issues are interdependent (because of the way the negotiations paired
unrelated issues together as linked concessions), parties have a conceptual
rationale and a limiting principle to explain which retaliations, even if seemingly
unrelated, are actually appropriate and proportionate.
One curiosity about the DSB's self-help-based remedies is that the parties
to the dispute already have the right to exercise self-help, as sovereign nations,
regardless of whether the DSB authorizes the offended party to take
countermeasures. 128 Though the world may disapprove of such unilateral
actions, a party who feels genuinely wronged could retaliate by suspending
125 DSU, 1869 UN Treaty Ser 401 at Art 22, 1 (cited in note 25) (providing that a party should only
apply such retaliatory measures after the party at fault fails to comply with the DSB's ruling).
126 WTO, United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Suppy of Gambling and Betting Services, WTO
Doc No WT/DS285/22 (June 22, 2007), online at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/rr/ds285-22-
rr.pdf (visited Nov 7, 2009) (assessing that Antigua should be allowed to suspend $21 million
worth of TRIPS obligations per year).
127 DSU, 1869 UN Treaty Set 401 at Art 22, 3-4 (cited in note 25) (requiring that the level of
suspension of concessions be equivalent to the level of the offense, and advising the party to try
to suspend within the same "sector" as the violation-for example, suspending service-related
concessions if the violation is under GATS).
128 See, for example, International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibiliy of States for
Internalionaly WrongfulActs, UN GAOR, 56th Sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/56/10, ch IV.E.1,
Arts 49-52 (2001) (requiring that countermeasures be proportionate and warning that
countermeasures are illegal once the dispute is submitted to a court, but omitting any conclusion
on the illegality of countermeasures prior to court involvement); see also Restatement (Third) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States at § 905 (cited in note 100) (recognizing that a
state victim may resort to countermeasures that might be otherwise unlawful if it will remedy the
violation and be proportionate).
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certain obligations, all on its own. Thus, when states parties voluntarily enlist the
DSB's help in resolving a dispute and selecting an appropriate countermeasure,
they are making a deliberate choice to invest in the credibility of the DSB. By
seeking to legitimate their actions under an international standard rather than a
unilateral standard, parties who submit to the DSB give the WTO an
opportunity to clarify treaty obligations and generate new law that fills in the
gaps left by the treaty texts. 129 Though states parties could theoretical!y act
independently, the DSB serves as a coordinating mechanism, even if it cannot
serve as an enforcing mechanism. Short of a massive, controversial breach,
parties seem to be willing to let the DSB create an internationally agreed-upon
reference point for where liability and proportionality lies. In that sense, the
WTO has built-in incentives for parties to commit to interdependence, because
the DSB serves a coordinating function in deciding which issues ought to be
linked and to what proportions. As the international controversy over the US'
use of Section 301 demonstrates, parties might prefer to bind one another to an
interdependent relationship by investing in an international dispute resolution
mechanism, rather than to risk a world where each party is its own judge.
Binding one another to a long-term, routine procedure makes sense when any
one given dispute is not worth the cost of creating new infrastructure from
scratch.
III. WHERE LINKAGE NEGOTIATIONS FAIL: USE OF SMALLER
UNITS WITHOUT INTERDEPENDENCE
In the space remaining, I address the importance of having both
properties-smallness and interdependence-in order to realize the benefits of
consensus in negotiations, treaty stability, and long-term cooperation. In much
of the linkage literature, issues are considered linked "when they are
simultaneously discussed for joint settlement.""13 David Leebron, in his article,
The Boundaries of the WTO: Linkages,' observes that negotiators and interest
groups have tried to tie all kinds of subject areas, however unrelated, to the
WTO trade regime. However, there is a limit to how far one can tie unrelated
issues together. Side payments, for instance, are a quintessential example of units
129 However, strictly speaking, the DSB is not authorized to create new law via interpretation, since
the WTO agreements stand "as is" as the product of many negotiations. In practice, however,
parties will inevitably adjust their behavior and expectations based on the precedents and
clarifications that come along with each case decision.
130 James K. Sebenius, Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Paries, 37 Intl Org 281,
287 (1983) (including side payments and log-rolling as common types of linkages).
131 Leebron, 96 Am J Intl L at 5-6 (cited in note 7) (noting that there have been attempts to tie trade
to environmental commitments, labor standards, and even human rights).
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of exchange that are small but not interdependent. 132 Many scholars have noted
that side payments, despite their easy divisibility and liquidity, are disfavored as
bargaining chips. 133 For example, in the Uruguay Round, developed countries
preferred to adjust their grants of food assistance in exchange for restricting
their agricultural export subsidies, rather than giving direct side payments. 134 The
advantages of interdependence, as discussed in this Comment, give one
explanation why merely dealing in small, easily convertible units might not be
enough to facilitate a long-term agreement, however convenient it may be in the
short term.
While breaking a large conflict into small sub-issues may have some
inherent advantages, it is not enough to maintain a long-term treaty relationship.
If the parties do not rearrange these sub-issues into an interdependent structure,
their side payments and linkages will not be sufficiently anchored to a conceptual
justification or limiting principle to give a clear reference point of where the
mutual obligations lie. Although there may be some advantages to having some
severable sub-issues in the agreement, as the WTO's method of prescribing
proportionate countermeasures illustrates, obligations that are too independent
from one another will disincentivize parties from building reliance on a long-
term "entanglement" with one another. As Oliver Williamson suggested in his
article, Credible Commitments,135 staking a binding investment in a cooperative
venture may build credibility for a long-term relationship, even if such an
entangling investment may seem undesirable from an efficient breach
standpoint.
As a last mini-case study, consider Mexico's proposal to the WTO
regarding the implementation of "tradable remedies.' ' 136 Mexico noted that small
or developing countries often encountered difficulty in enforcing effective
countermeasures when larger, developed countries breached a WTO
132 See Section I.A.2.
133 See, for example, Leebron, 96 Am J Intl L at 14 (cited in note 7) (observing that the developed
countries preferred to establish a long-term fund to help developing nations pay for environment
protection measures, rather than making an "unrestricted side payment")
134 Id (citing Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-
Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries, in Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, in World Trade Organization, The Legal Texts:
The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 392 (Cambridge 1999)).
135 See Williamson, 73 Am Econ Rev at 19 (cited in note 38) (investments that appear undesirable
may help build credibility for long-term relationships).
136 WTO, DSB, Special Session, Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding-Proposal by Mexico ("Mexico Proposal'), WTO Doc No
TN/DS/W/23 (Nov 21, 2002).
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obligation. 137 Because smaller, developing nations cannot effectively take
advantage of DSB's self-help remedies, Mexico proposed that such countries
should have the right to auction off their remedies to other states.' 38
At first glance, the auction system seems to run into the same problem as
side payments: it uses a "smaller," more separable unit of exchange without
creating the interdependence necessary to make it credible currency. The current
WTO policy requires that the remedies are similar in kind to the breach: the
DSB sets a maximum value that the offending country can recover through its
countermeasures, and it requires that the countermeasure should affect the same
treaty "sector" (GATT, GATS, or TRIPS) as the breach, whenever possible.'39
However, the tradable remedy has the effect of unhitching the consequences of
the breach from the relational and conceptual context built by the WTO's
network of treaty concessions. Countries may find the auction system unsettling
because of the political friction and public misperceptions that may occur when
a third-party country who has not been offended earns the right to "retaliate"
against a defendant. 4 0
Also, the remedy may change in value as the ownership changes. Even if
theoretically, the buyer country must adhere to the same exact numerical value
limits as the auctioning country when it imposes the remedy, in practice, this
numerical value is probably discounted based on who the party is. For example,
if a poor island country wins a $100 million remedy, it may cost the offending
party nothing if it already conducts less than a $100 million worth of trade with
the country. If the EU won that award in an auction, however, a $100 million
remedy may create serious trade consequences for the offending country.
Furthermore, Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Robert W. Staiger, in a
study analyzing the economic implications of Mexico's proposal, suggest that the
auction system necessarily creates an externality, because when the auction
winner implements the anticompetitive countermeasure, a portion of the goods
or services that are blocked will be diverted to the losing party's markets.' 4 ' Such
an externality could create perverse incentives for parties to try to lose the
auction or bid higher for it than they would based on the absolute value of the
137 Consider Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Robert W. Staiger, The Case for Tradable Remedies
in 1/TO Dipute Settlement 14-15 (May 2004) (unpublished working paper), online at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=610359 (visited Nov 7, 2009) (giving
empirical support that smaller countries cannot effectively implement countermeasures, and often
refuse to attempt them at all).
138 Mexico Proposal at 5 (cited in note 136).
139 DSU, 1869 UN Treaty Set 401 at Art 22, 3-4 (cited in note 25).
140 Bagwell, Mavroidis, and Staiger, The Case for Tradable Remedies in W70 Dispute Settlement at 17 (cited
in note 137).
141 Id at 17-18.
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countermeasure, because they are conscious of the adverse consequences that
the countermeasure could have on the auction loser's markets.142 There is also
the possibility that the infringing government would capitalize on its perception
that the DSB has undervalued the breach or that the victim state will sell the
remedy at a discounted price because there will be no takers. Although the
proposal does not anticipate that the infringing government could participate in
the auction, if an infringing government were allowed to buy off the remedy at
what it perceives to be a discounted price, then this would endanger the
deterrence system established under the DSB.
143
Theoretically speaking, however, an auction system is not inherently
incapable of creating a structure that encourages interdependence. For example,
negotiators of the Uruguay Round were able to link issue areas that were
traditionally completely alien to one another and build a conceptual
understanding that one country's agricultural export entitlements can be linked
to another country's intellectual property rights. The negotiation history of the
Uruguay Round, and the package deals that resulted, help justify these new
conceptual links of interdependence. Similarly, if an auction system had been a
part of the original negotiations and parties had created enough linkages to
condition the exercise of their entitlements to the success of the auction system,
perhaps the auction system could have worked. The developed nations and the
developing nations would probably have had to create some sort of discounting
system to take account of the changes in value and externalities that occur when
a remedy changes ownership. Or, alternatively, countries could have collectively
decided to accept that this variation in value is a part of the auction system and
left the externalities uncorrected, assuming that the possibility of spillover effects
would generate international pressure for countries not to breach in the first
place. However, the problem currently facing the Mexico proposal is that these
compromises and policy decisions were not negotiated ex ante. Without a prior
conceptual link based on negotiation history, it is hard for countries to justify an
ex post adjustment that changes the potential value of their remedies. Countries
carefully take into consideration who they are offending and decide whether they
can afford to offend such parties in a larger context of foreign policy,
reciprocity, and long-term trade relations. Because parties have already invested
heavily in building expertise and norms around this identity-based political web,
it is unlikely that a new system of interdependence will emerge around the
auction system, unless it had been explicitly negotiated beforehand. Given the
costs and uncertainties involved in instituting a new system, the transaction costs
of negotiating tradable remedies may simply be too high.
142 Id at 19.
143 Id at 29.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This Comment has explored how countries could negotiate and maintain
more stable treaties by conceptualizing their legal entitlements in smaller units
and conditioning the exercise of these entitlements on continued cooperation
and investment in an ongoing system of interdependence. Countries can benefit
from the flexibility and cross-issue linkages that come with unbundling particular
issues from a larger policy (as in the WTO negotiations) or, to borrow a
metaphor from property theory, trading individual sticks from the bundle of
territorial rights (as in the UNCLOS negotiations). However, as the Mexico
proposal for tradable remedies illustrates, merely working in narrowly framed or
highly exchangeable entitlements is often not enough to forge a viable
agreement. This Comment tries to add to the current academic discussion on
linkages and treaty negotiation by emphasizing the importance of
interdependence, even long after the negotiations have concluded. When
structuring treaty obligations, negotiators should give opportunities for countries
to invest in a long-term relationship. For example, they can create dispute
settlement mechanisms that coordinate how parties react to breaches and save
the parties the transaction costs of renegotiating an equilibrium after each
breach. As parties begin to build reliance on the dispute settlement mechanism,
the mechanism can serve as a way to generate international norms that clarify
parties' obligations to one another. A treaty might also encourage long-term
relationships between parties by requiring them to make an ongoing investment
in a joint venture. By binding parties to make credible monetary and political
commitments to an international infrastructure, a treaty can make breaches
costly and thus incentivize parties to compete within the system rather than
without. A treaty could link entitlements together as a system of package deals at
the negotiations stage, so that parties can justify how the breach of an obligation
in one area can affect their entitlements in another. Pairing specific entitlements
to specific obligations can also help contain the negative effects of breaches
when they do occur, by creating a sensible measuring stick for determining
proportional retaliations.
Creating these interdependent relationships help treaties gain institutional
inertia, and states should take into account the added benefits that come from
having a stable system that coordinates collective action and strengthens
international norms over time before they decide to engage in short-term
opportunistic behavior. Unlike private parties who may contract at arm's length
and participate in a market of infinite sellers and buyers, states are stuck with
one another for the long run, and the number of potential allies and trading
partners is finite. Where private parties can have the luxury of contemplating the
"efficient breach," self-interested states must consider the cost of forgoing
stable, long-term relationships. The creation of a predictable, reliable world
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order may be the greatest positive externality of all, and the prospect of
capturing these benefits may be worth the encumbrance of binding one's
government to a highly interdependent, long-term commitment.
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